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Statement of Appellate Jurisdiction
This Court has ordered review of a court of appeals decision dated May 15, 2008.
A timely petition for certiorari was filed on June 16, 2008. See Utah R. App. P. 22(a),
48(a). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5).
Statement of the Issues
This Court granted certiorari to review the following issues, repeated here
verbatim from the Court's order of August 27, 2008:
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the scope of the Revised

Limited Liability Company Act in relation to its affirmance of a verdict for repudiation of
a limited liability company agreement.
2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the district court's

adjudication of claims and defenses presented below.
3.

Whether the court of appeals and district court misapprehended the

appropriate roles of judge and jury in adjudicating the claims and defenses presented
below.
These issues will each be addressed in context in the course of the brief.
Statement of Standards of Review
1.

The proper interpretation and scope of the Utah Revised Limited Liability

Company Act present questions of law, which this Court reviews for correctness with no
deference given to the lower court's determinations. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31,
H 7, 158 P.3d 540 (holding LLC Act's statutory interpretation "involve[s] conclusions of
law that we review for correctness").
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2.

The proper outcome of legal motions is reviewed for correctness with no

deference given to any conclusion of law reached below. See Parduhn v Bennett, 2002
UT 93, ^1 5, 61 P.3d 982 (summary judgment review); Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999
UT 14,11 3, 975 P.2d 467 (directed verdict motion); Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.,
91 5 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The evidence
and all reasonable inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See, e.g., Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^ 16, 990 P.2d 933. Incorrect jury
instructions result in reversal when a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of the
proceeding was affected. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ^ 20, 993 P.2d 191.
3.

Where the respective roles of judge and jury were defined on the record, the

lower courts' proper apprehension of the same is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.,
Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, U 21, 186 P.3d 989 (holding that district court's
designation of jury as advisory was reviewed for correctness). The district judge's
discretionary determinations in setting procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See id. Underlying legal determinations are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Loose,
2000 UT 11,^8, 994 P.2d 1237.
Statement of Preservation Below
Each of the issues presented was raised and preserved in the court of appeals and
in the district court. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 1, 19-49; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3-26; R.
38-66, 117-27, 158-65, 272-305, 323-32, 367-89, 484-502, 524-36, 608-70, 882-97, 899901,919-36,997-1000, 1032-1100, 1104-72, 1175, 1189-1207, 1210-12, 1247-1384,
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1410-13, 1419-93, 1504-16, 1524-29, 1546-48, 1554-61, 1611-13, 1632-37, 1686-1792,
1871-1957, 1983-84, 1999-2000, 2007-32.)
Controlling Statutory Provisions
The parties agree that the relevant statute is the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-101 to -1902 (2001). (Cert. Petition at 2; Cert. Opp. at 1;
Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 3; Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 3.) The provisions of the Act are included
as part of the separately bound addendum, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) & (11).
Two definitional sections from the Act are important in this appeal:
48-2c-102(16).

Definitions [Operating agreement].

"Operating agreement" means any written agreement of the members
concerning the business or purpose of the company and the conduct of its affairs,
and which complies with Part 5 [of the Act, governing such agreements]. An
operating agreement includes any written amendments agreed to by all members
or other writing adopted in any other manner as may be provided in the operating
agreement.
48-2c-102(3). Definitions [Capital account].
"Capital account," unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement,
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the company for
each member to reflect the value of all contributions by that member, the amount
of all distributions to that member or the member's assignee, the member's share
of profits, gains, and losses of the company, and the member's share of the net
assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to the
member or the member's assignee.
In addition to these definitions, several key provisions of the Act are at issue in
this appeal, which will be discussed in context in the Argument. Chief among them are
the substantive provisions related to LLC capital accounts, allocation of profits and
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losses, distributions, dissolution, and winding up, which are set out here for the Court's
convenience when considering the Argument:
48-2c-903.

Capital accounts.

(1)
A capital account shall be maintained for each member. The
capital account of each member represents that member's share of the net
assets of the company. Except as otherwise provided in the articles of
organization or operation agreement, the capital accounts of all members
shall be adjusted, either increased or decreased, to reflect the revaluation of
company assets, including intangible assets such as goodwill, on the
company's books in connection with any of the following events:
(a)
a capital contribution, other than a de minimis
contribution, made by or on behalf of a new member or an additional
capital contribution, other than a de minimis contribution, made by
or on behalf of an existing member;
(b)
a distribution, other than a de minimis amount, made
in partial or complete redemption of a member's interest in the
company; or
(c)
the dissolution and winding up of the company.
(2)
Upon any such revaluation event, the book value of company
assets shall be adjusted to fair market value and unrealized income, gain,
loss, or deduction inherent in such company assets that have not been
previously reflected in the members' capital accounts shall be allocated to
the members' capital accounts.
48-2c-906.

Allocation of profits and losses.

The profits and losses of a company shall be allocated among the
members in the manner provided in the operating agreement. If the
operating agreement does not otherwise provide, profits and losses shall be
allocated in proportion to the members' capital account balances as of the
beginning of the company's current fiscal year.
48-2c-1003. Timing of distributions.
Distributions to members shall be made at the times or upon the
happening of the events specified in the operating agreement. If the
operating agreement does not otherwise provide, each current distribution
shall be made to all members concurrently, or at other times determined by
the members in a member-managed company, or by the managers in a
manager-managed company.
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48-2c-1003. Liquidating distributions.
Distributions to the members in connection with the dissolution and
winding up of a company shall be made in accordance with Section 48-2c1308.
48-2c-120L Events of dissolution.
A company organized under this chapter shall be dissolved upon the
occurrence of any of the following events:
(7)
upon entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under
Section 48-2c-1213.
48-2c-1203. Effect of dissolution.
(1)
A dissolved company continues its existence but may not
carry on any business or activities except as appropriate to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs, as provided in Part 13 of this chapter.
(2)
Dissolution of a company does not:
(a)
transfer title to the company's property;
(b)
prevent transfer of an interest in the company;
(c)
subject its members or managers to standards of
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8;
(d)
change:
(i)
limited liability provided under Part 6 of this
chapter;
(ii)
voting requirements for its members or
managers;
(iii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal
of its managers; or
(iv) provisions for amending its articles of
organization or operating agreement;
(e)
prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against
the company in its company name;
(f)
abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against
the company on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g)
terminate the authority of the registered agent of the
company.
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48-2e-1210. Grounds for judicial dissolution.
(2)
A company may be dissolved in a proceeding filed by any
member if it is established that:
(a)
the managers are deadlocked in management of
company affairs and the members are unable to break the deadlock,
irreparable injury to the company is threatened or being suffered, or
the business and affairs of the company can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of the members generally, because of the deadlock;
(b)
the managers or those in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent;
(c)
the members are deadlocked in voting power and the
deadlock has continued for a period of at least six months;
(d)
the company assets are being misapplied or wasted; or
(e)
it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business of
the company in conformity with its articles of organization and
operating agreement.

48- 2c-1213. Decree of dissolution.
(1)
If after a hearing the court determines that one or more
grounds for judicial dissolution described in Section 48-2c-1210 exist, ii
may enter a decree dissolving the company and specifying the effective
date of the dissolution. The clerk of the court shall deliver a certified copy
of the decree to the division for filing and shall mail a copy of the decree to
the registered agent of the company or to the division if it has no registered
agent of record.
(2)
After entering the decree of dissolution, the court shall direct
the winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in
accordance with Part 13.
(3)
The court's order may be appealed as in other civil
proceedings.
48-2c-1301. Winding up defined.
The winding up of a dissolved company is the process consisting of
collecting all amounts owed to the company, selling or otherwise disposing
of the company's assets and property, paying or discharging the taxes,
debts and liabilities of the company or making provision for the payment or
discharge, and distributing all remaining company assets and property
among the members of the company according to their interests. There is
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no fixed time period for completion of winding up a dissolved company
except that the winding up should be completed within a reasonable time
under the circumstances.
48-2c-1308. Distribution of assets on winding up.
(1)
After dissolution, and during winding up, the assets of the
company shall be applied to pay or satisfy:
(a)
first, the liabilities to creditors other than members, in
the order of priority as provided by law;
(b)
second, the liabilities to members in their capacities as
creditors, in the order of priority as provided by law; and
(c)
third, the expenses and cost of winding up.
(2)
Company assets remaining after application under Subsection
(1) shall be allocated and distributed to the members as provided in the
articles of organization or operating agreement, or if not so provided, in
accordance with the members' final capital account balances after
allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses accrued or
incurred during winding up.
Statement of the Case
This appeal queries whether the provisions of the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Company Act ("Act," "Revised Act," or "LLC Act") provide the rule of decision in a
dispute between LLC members relating to their LLC. If the answer is yes, then the case
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to apply the Act correctly in this case.
If the answer is no, then the appeal further queries whether the common law was properly
applied to this dispute.
In particular, the Court is called upon to determine the viability of an extrastatutory "LLC repudiation" cause of action adopted by the court of appeals. If any such
repudiation claim was adopted or adjudicated improperly on this record, then this Court
should reverse and remand with instructions to correct the error. In resolving these

issues, the Court should give guidance to the lower courts and to litigants and their
counsel on the proper rules of decision and procedure to apply in Utah LLC disputes.
Course of Proceedings aod Disposition Below
The entity at the heart of this dispute is OLP, L.L.C. ("OLP" or "the LLC"), a
Utah limited liability company managed by its members. (Ex. 68.) Wayne Burningham
and Richard Wilson are its only members. (Ex. 68.)
District Court Proceedings
On July 25, 2001, Wilson sued Bumingham for relief related to OLP. (R. 1, 3, 25,
32-37.) Wilson alleged the ongoing existence of the LLC, which he named as a plaintiff.
(R. 1, 17, 225, 428.) He sought, inter alia, "an order adjudging, declaring and decreeing
that he is entitled to a full accounting of the expenses, revenues, profits and losses of the
LLC." (R. 15-17, 224, 427.) He also pleaded contract and fiduciary duty claims against
Burningham and his sole corporation, Optical Lens Products Management, Inc., d/b/a
Intermountain Antireflective Coatings ("IARC," pronounced "eye-arc"). (R. 18-22.)
Wilson's second claim for relief alleged common law anticipatory repudiation. (R. 18.)
Burningham and IARC answered and counterclaimed on August 31, 2001. (R.
38.) Burningham acknowledged the ongoing existence of OLP. (R. 39, 42.) He alleged
that in the absence of a defining operating agreement, the LLC members' capital accounts
determined the members' respective rights. (R. 56, 59-60, 294-95, 501.) He sought
judicial dissolution of OLP, a decree winding it up and distributing assets to its members
per their capital accounts, and other determinations under the LLC Act. (R. 58-60, 63,
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293-95, 501.) Burningham and 1ARC also advanced counterclaims and sought equitable
relief. (R. 60-65.)
Burningham subsequently moved for partial summary judgment seeking a decree
of judicial dissolution of OLP under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1210(2) to "enable the LLC
to wind up its affairs, pay off its debts, and account for and distribute its remaining
assets.55 (R. 123, 117-23, 158-65, 608-27.) Burningham argued based on the record
evidence that the LLC should be dissolved as of August 31, 2001. (R. 623-24.) He asked
that upon dissolution the court take the statutory steps prescribed in the LLC Act for
winding up the LLC and making appropriate distributions to its members. (R. 625.) He
argued that all such distributions should be undertaken in accordance with the LLC
members' capital account balances as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1308. (R.
528, 625.) Burningham further moved to limit all damage issues to an LLC accounting
and to strike the jury or clarify jury issues. (R. 524-32, 669-70, 882-87.)
Wilson opposed these motions. (R. 159, 171-87, 696-722, 1918, 2017 at 33.) He
argued that the provisions of the LLC Act did not limit him in seeking common law
damages in a jury trial. (R. 696-701, 718-19, 2017 at 33-34.) In support, he argued that
the analogous rule of decision in the partnership cases of Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 1977), and Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1985), allowed
common law damages despite dissolution. (R. 700.)
Gherman and Jeaness allowed post-dissolution damages when the partnership had
been "wrongfully dissolved." See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah
App. 1990). A necessary element of wrongful dissolution was that a partner "repudiate"

the partnership. See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343. Gherman held that partnership
"repudiation" in this context occurs when a partner denies "the very existence of a
partnership or joint venture relationship in any form or at any time." Id. Burningham
maintained below that, as a matter of law, Wilson could not meet the criteria of a
Gherman/Jeaness wrongful dissolution because there had never been a denial by either
member of the existence of their LLC relationship. (R. 1206.)
Burningham's LLC motions came before the court for decision following a
lengthy discovery period. (R. 159, 168-70, 205, 267-71, 450-51, 473-74, 1918, 2014 at
3-6, 2015 at 17, 2016, 2017 at 33.) The district court observed it was "undisputed that
this [LLC] is broken and should be dissolved." (R. 2016 at 2.) Nevertheless, the court
denied Burningham's motions without prejudice. (R. 1023, 2016 at 30.) The court then
ordered the legal case to proceed before a jury, with equitable claims reserved for the
court thereafter. (R. 1023, 2016 at 43, 2017-28.) The terms "equity" and "equitable
claims" wrere used by the district court and the parties to refer to those claims reserved for
decision by the court, including LLC determinations governed by statute. (R.1583; Ct.
App. Aplee. Br. at 21, 38; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 17 n.8.)
During trial, Burningham renewed his dissolution motion as a directed verdict
request. (R. 1203-07, 2024 at 978-81, 989-90.)
[BURNINGHAM5S COUNSEL]:...[W]e would renew our Motion for
Summary Judgment that we brought before trial that the Court determine as a
matter of law that the LLC is dissolved. The evidence as presented by the plaintiff
in this case is undisputed that by August 31, 2001 when Mr. Burningham's
petition for judicial dissolution was filed that the conditions for judicial dissolution
had been shown. . . .
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THE COURT: As [of] which date, the date of filing?
[BURNINGHAM'S COUNSEL]: Correct, August 31 st , 2001 which was
the date that Mr. Burningham came into this court and petitioned the court to
intervene judicially and to oversee the dissolution windup.
(R. 2024 at 978-79.) At this point, the court granted the dissolution motion. (R. 2024 at
988-89, 2026 at 1247-49 & 1282.) The court ruled:
[THE COURT]: For the record, I am determining and I think it's time to do so that
a dissolution occurred - and I already went through the statutory basis and the
facts under 48-2C-1210-2 [the judicial dissolution provisions of the LLC Act], a
dissolution did occur no later than August 31, 2001 and that is the date we'll use.
(R. 2026 at 1282; see alsoK. 2026 at 1247-82.)
The court simultaneously ruled that the jury could find damages after the date of
dissolution if the jury found a "wrongful dissolution" of the LLC. (R. 2026 at 1282.)
The district court instructed the jury to find wrongful dissolution if it first found
"Burningham repudiated his agreement with Wilson regarding the operation of the LLC."
(R. 1145.) The court would not, however, give an instruction that "repudiation" in the
wrongful dissolution context called for the partner or member to deny the existence of the
relationship. (R. 1095.) Instead, the court defined the required repudiation as follows:
A party repudiates a contract when that party does or says anything indicating that
it does not intend to perform the contract. Repudiation is not the mere breach of
the contract, or some of its terms.
(R. 1145-46.) Burningham objected to the giving of this instruction. (R. 2028 at 1547.)
Wilson's contention in the case was that he and Burningham had entered into an
oral agreement to share LLC profits equally, which should be enforced according to its
terms. (R. 6, 2026 at 1327.) Burningham's contention was that, in the absence of a

written operating agreement, LLC profits were calculated according to the members'
respective capital accounts under the LLC Act. (R. 42, 59-60, 2026 at 1327.) In
response to Wilson's arguments that Burningham's contributions to the LLC were
"loans" from IARC, the court instructed the jury that capital contributions could be made
by or on behalf of a member. (R. 1157; 2026 at 1319-32.) The court also instructed the
jury that a loan was not a capital contribution. (R. 1157.)
In arguing his contentions to the district court, Burningham asked that the jurors
be instructed on calculating LLC capital accounts under the Revised Act so that they
could properly measure the conduct of the parties and their agents and consider the
parties' interests. (R. 2026 at 1319-32.) Following discussion, the court and counsel
jointly concluded that the capital accounts determination would be for the district judge
to make following the close of the jury trial. (R. 2026 at 1329-30.) The court observed:
"1 don't think you can start going through the statute as a formula when that's not really
what you're asking them [the jury] to do and that's reserved for the Court." (R. 2026 at
1329.) The court ruled that to instruct the jury on calculating capital accounts would be
"taking away what you both agreed is going to be the Court's function." (R. 2026 at
1330.) Accordingly, no instruction was given to the jury on calculating LLC members'
capital accounts and no capital accounts determination was given to the jury. (R. 1084,
1104-08, 2026 at 1330, 2028 at 1628.)
The district court ruled instead that it would conduct post-trial proceedings to
determine the members' LLC capital accounts, address Burningham's equitable claims
and defenses, and conduct an LLC accounting and winding up. (R. 1023, 1158, 2025 at
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1176, 2026 at 1319-30, 2028 at 1507-11 & 1530.) The court told the parties that they
need not put on all their evidence at the jury trial. (R. 2016 at 43-44.) The court ruled
that the jury's determinations on the parties' respective interests in OLP, made without
the benefit of all the LLC Act's provisions, would be "advisory only." (R. 2014 at 2-11,
2028 at 1507-11.)
The court declined, however, to require the jury to make specific factual findings.
(R. 1410-13, 1419-21, 2026 at 1372-73, 1104-08, 2028 at 1508-10.) Instead, the court
resolved Burningham's stated concerns about the specificity of the verdict form by
directing that the court would take the information gained from the jury verdict and apply
it subsequently in the "equity" phase of the case. (R. 1583, 2028 at 1507-11; Ct. App.
Aplee. Br. at 21, 38; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 17 n.8.) The jurors were instructed that
"[t]he court, not the jury, will determine the dissolution, windup, and termination of the
LLC" and "not to concern yourselves with such issues." (R. 1158.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding "wrongful
dissolution" of the LLC by Burningham and awarding Wilson post-dissolution damages.
(R. 1104-08, 1879, 1954, 2023 at 828-29 & 832-33, 2028 at 1532-35.) Wilson then
argued that the jury had decided all issues and that a judgment should enter on the
verdict. (R. 1494-1500.) Burningham opposed this request based on the trial record,
asking for the post-trial determinations previously reserved by the district judge. (R.
1517-29.)
The district judge agreed with Wilson, denying Burningham's motion to hold LLC
proceedings, to determine the members' capital accounts, or to treat the jury's findings as

advisory only. (R. 1524-29, 1551-57, 1583-87.) Instead, the court entered a judgment
for Wilson in the full amount of the verdict, representing profits of the LLC totaling more
than $1.2 million. (R. 1641-42.) No judgment was entered for IARC to repay "loans"
made to the LLC. (R. 1641-42.)
Burningham and IARC sought to correct the district court's error through postjudgment motions. (R. 1686-1716.) The district judge vacated the judgment entered
against IARC but denied all other relief. (R. 1978-82.) Burningham and IARC then
posted a bond and appealed. (R. 1671-73, 1846-48, 1968-69, 1978-81, 1983-84.)
Court of Appeals Proceedings
In the court of appeals, Burningham argued that the district court improperly
deprived him of the rights and protections of the LLC Act by failing to apply its
provisions properly to the parties' dispute. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 19-29.) Burningham
further argued that, to the extent common law and equity interacted with the LLC Act,
the court incorrectly instructed the jury and erred in conducting proceedings so as never
to reach the determinations called for by the LLC Act. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 29-49.)
In response, Wilson argued that the district court "was not obligated to apply the
procedures under the Act." (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 17.) Wilson further called the LLC
Act a set of "alternative provisions." (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 18.) He relied on pre-LLC
Act partnership law to argue a plaintiff may choose whether to proceed under the Act.
(Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 17.)
A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court decision.
Judge Thorne, writing for the panel, ruled that Wilson could recover on a claim the
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intermediate appeals court denominated as LLC "repudiation." (Ct. App. Op. 1 9 n.4.)
The court used this theory rather than the "wrongful dissolution" nomenclature invoked
in the district court. (Ct. App. Op. 1 9 n.4.) The court deliberately departed from the
Gherman decision, acknowledging that on this record, "if we were to import Gherman
directly into Utah LLC law, Burningham would appear to be correct that the parties'
mutual acknowledgment of OLP's existence would preclude a repudiation claim." (Ct.
App. Op. 1 38.) Instead, the court modified Gherman so that such a prerequisite would
not exist in Utah law. (Ct. App. Op. 1 39.) The court then affirmed the application of
this LLC repudiation claim by a showing of anticipatory contract breach. (Id.)
The court of appeals also resolved Burningham's arguments regarding application
of the LLC Act by concluding that the jury had impliedly ruled on all the issues he had
pleaded. The court held that an adequate LLC accounting of the parties' respective
capital accounts and ownership interests had been presented to and decided by the jury:
[T]he jury in this case apparently rejected Burningham's allegations that he had
contributed substantially greater finding to OLP than had Wilson, and, instead,
adopted Wilson's version of events whereby Wilson was at least a fifty-percent
owner of OLP. Thus, the jury's verdict considered the dispute between the parties
as to the ownership percentages of OLP and resolved that dispute in Wilson's
favor.
... Under Wilson's version of events, which the jury apparently adopted, Wilson
and Burningham formed OLP with equal ownership rights and Wilson contributed
further capital while Burningham only loaned money to OLP through 1ARC.
Under this set of facts, Wilson's ownership interest in OLP would actually have
exceeded Burningham's by the time Burningham excluded Wilson from the
company.
(Ct. App. Op. 1117, 20.)
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The court of appeals further rejected Burningham's argument that the district court
erred in failing to implement its dissolution decision under the LLC Act. The court of
appeals ruled "it is by no means clear that the district court's order determining the
August 31. 2001 dissolution date of OLP was intended to be a formal order of dissolution
under the LLC Act." (Ct. App. Op. ^ 23.) "[T]he purpose of the district court's order
does not appear to have been to formally dissolve OLP, but rather to establish a cutoff
date for Wilson's lost profit damages if the jury found that Burningham had breached the
parties' agreement but had not done so in such a matter [sic] as to constitute a repudiation
of the agreement." {Id.) Even so, the court ruled there is "no persuasive reason why that
dissolution would impair the jury's ability to award Wilson repudiation damages"
because Wilson's repudiation claim "is merely an action for damages between business
partners, arising from circumstances that will often, but not always, also support
dissolution of the LLC." (Ct. App. Op. \ 24.)
Next, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision not to supervise a
winding up and liquidation of the LLC. (Ct. App. Op. ^J 28.) "As a practical matter, after
the judgment in favor of Wilson, Burningham remained as the member or former member
most ably situated to perform OLP's winding up." (Ct. App. Op. ^31.) "While the
district court perhaps failed to comply with the statute when it did not expressly 'direct'
Bumingham" in winding up, the court of appeals concluded that no prejudice resulted.
{id.)
Lastly, the court of appeals ruled that there was no error in how the district court
handled Burningham's equitable issues because, under Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky
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Mm. Irr., Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), a jury's factual determinations bind a trial
court's equitable determinations when both turn on the same operative facts. (Ct. App.
Op. TI 34.) The court rejected Burningham's and IARC's subsidiary arguments and
affirmed the district court's judgment. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 51.)
This Court then granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.
Statement of Facts
In 1988, Wayne Burningham formed IARC as a sole corporation. (R. 2021 at
493-94.) IARC coated eyeglass lenses on a machine purchased in 1993. (R. 182, 2024 at
1061-63; Add. Ex. U, % 2.) Since its inception, IARC's principal customer was Cole
Vision. (R. 2021 at 493-94, 2024 at 1057, 1061, 1072^73, 1075, 1083.) Burningham
hired Richard Wilson as an IARC employee in 1995. (R. 2020 at 389, 2025 at 1138; Exs.
153, 155.)
In 1998, Burningham offered Wilson the opportunity to form OLP. (R. 2018 at
235-42, 2024 at 1081.) OLP purchased a second lens coating machine, incurring bank
debt of approximately $573,000. (R. 6, 43, 2019 at 283-84; Ex. 69.) Both IARC and
OLP were to use the second machine and share operating expenses on a per lens basis.
(R. 2019 at 271, 2020 at 406, 2021 at 495.) The two companies each had their own
customers. (R. 44, 1377-78 & 1383, 2020 at 423, 2019 at 274-75, 2021 at 494 & 578,
2024 at 1096-97,2027 at 1397-1400.) All transactions were handled through IARC. (R.
2019 at 270, 2020 at 439.)
Burningham and Wilson orally agreed at the outset to share equal ownership and
control of OLP, to contribute matching capital contributions, and to equally share profits
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and losses. (R. 6, 42, 2019 at 274 & 286, 2021 at 491 & 499-500, 2028 at 1511.) No
agreement was reached as to what would happen if one party contributed greater capital
investments than the other. (R. 2020 at 422; see Exs. 68-69.)
The two LLC members executed a document titled "Operating Agreement,"
which, despite its name, the parties acknowledge as a bare-bones expense agreement with
I ARC that makes no mention of LLC internal operations. (Ex. 69; R. 7, 2026 at 1324.)
Other than a standard form articles of organization, there was no written operating
agreement or governing document executed between the LLC members that defined their
rights and responsibilities as members. (Exs. 68-69.)
A dispute aiose when Wilson ceased making capital contributions after investing
$23,500. (R. 2019 at 285-86, 2020 at 405 & 437 & 452; Exs. 209-14.) Burningham
continued infusing OLP with operating capital totaling $330,000 to $340,000 by at least
August 2001 and more than $500,000 by the time of trial in late 2004. (R. 2025 at 120304; Exs. 64-66, 172, 244, 246, 613.) Burningham directed this capital to OLP from his
sole corporation, IARC. (R. 2021 at 500, 504.) The capital infusions were labeled
"loans" or "advances" by Burningham's bookkeeper using the default coding provisions
of the Quick Books computer accounting system. (R. 2021 at 673-76, 2025 at 1189-92.)
A certified public accountant employed by Burningham and OLP then treated them as
Burningham's capital contributions and labeled them accordingly. (R. 2021 at 673-76.)
The dispute between the members ripened when Wilson claimed that Cole Vision
was OLP's customer, entitling Wilson to profits from IARC's longtime principal
customer. (R. 2018 at 236 & 239, 2019 at 269, 2021 at 494, 2024 at 1081-83; see R. 7.)
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When reconciliation efforts failed, Wilson filed suit advancing contract and fiduciary
duty claims and seeking an LLC accounting. (R. 1, 2019 at 335-37, 2020 at 415-16 &
420, 2021 at 646 & 650-61, 2022 at 757-58 & 789; Ex. 33.) Bumingham then terminated
Wilson's 1ARC employment. (Exs. 72-74.) Bumingham nevertheless acknowledged the
ongoing existence of OLP and the members' statutory rights and obligations. (Exs. 73,
593.) Bumingham then counterclaimed against Wilson seeking judicial dissolution, an
accounting, and a winding up of OLP's business pursuant to the LLC Act. (R. 38-66.)
Summary of the Arguments
This Court should reverse and remand for three principal reasons.
First, the decision below should be reversed because the governing provisions of
the LLC Act did not form the basis for the judgment entered in the district court. The
LLC Act applies to this dispute between LLC members. In the absence of a written
operating agreement, the Act is the members' contract. The Act provides that profits are
allocated to members according to their capital accounts.
Here, the decision on the parties' capital accounts was specifically reserved for the
district court but never reached. The court of appeals erred in concluding on this record
that the jury properly considered the parties' ownership interests and made binding
findings. The effect was to materially prejudice Bumingham by depriving him of the
chance to be heard on his principal claim using the governing provisions of the LLC Act
as the rule of decision.
Second, the decision below should be reversed because the court of appeals
incorrectly applied the common law in this case. The court formulated an "LLC

in

repudiation" claim that deviates from the common law standard and conflicts with the
record in this case. "Repudiation" under the Gherman standard was one element of a
"wrongful dissolution" damages limitation addressed in the district court. It was not
common law anticipatory repudiation as pleaded by Wilson.
Furthermore, the court of appeals failed to give effect to the district court's legal
determination judicially dissolving the LLC. The elements were met for statutory
judicial dissolution, which is a "rightful" dissolution as a matter of law. The courts
should give effect to the statutory implications of a judicial dissolution, which include a
winding up, accounting, and final distribution under the Act.
Gherman was wrongly applied in this case. As a matter of law, the repudiation
element found in Gherman was improperly modified to eliminate the very distinction that
gives rise to the extraordinary Gherman remedy. That element cannot be met on this
record, where the parties had a dispute over the scope and accounting of their LLC but
not over its existence. "Repudiation" as articulated by the court of appeals cannot stand
on this record under either a statutory or common law analysis.
Third, the court of appeals erred in sanctioning a procedure in this case that
deprived Bumingham of the opportunity to have each of his claims and defenses litigated.
The court of appeals found no reason to insist upon the winding up of OLP defined by the
LLC Act. This despite the fact that the Act says the court "shall" direct the company's
winding up and liquidation. By declining to require use of the LLC Act, the court below
allowed a judgment for LLC profits to stand independent of the provisions of the Act.
Those provisions treat LLC profits as part of a member's capital account, to be
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determined and distributed in a winding up - but only after payment of debt and
satisfaction of creditors. Under the Act, Wilson would be entitled to a capital accounts
credit, not a check for profits free and clear of any LLC obligations. Burningham was
entitled to an actual, reviewable LLC accounting, which he pleaded but never received.
Finally, the district court's procedural decisions left Burningham without a forum
in which to try his purely equitable (as opposed to statutory) claims and defenses, which
differed on their operative facts from the claims considered by the jury. Utah law
requires that a litigant have notice and an opportunity to be heard before its claims and
defenses are foreclosed. Reversal is called for where such basic process was not
afforded.
For each of these reasons, individually and collectively, the decision of the court
of appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for appropriate further proceedings.
Argument
I.

The court of appeals committed reversible error by failing to require the
district court to adjudicate this case using the governing provisions of the
LLC Act before entering a judgment.
A.

The Act's provisions provide the LLC contract.

"Utah enacted the Limited Liability Company Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-101
to -158 (1998) (repealed 2001), in 1991 in response to the need for expanded flexibility
and utility in companies with limited liability and pass-through taxation for the owners.5'
CCA L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^ 11 n.l, 116 P.3d 366 (citing Brent R. Armstrong,
New Revisions to Utah's Limited Liability Company Act - the LLC Revolution Rolls On,
Utah State Bar Journal, June/July 2001). "The Act provided 'default' rules which apply

automatically in the absence of rules specified in the governing documents, the articles of
organization, or the operating agreement." Id.
"In 2001, Utah enacted the Revised Limited Liability Company Act, which added
new definitions, varying and limiting certain obligations . . . ." Id. (citing Ruth Quigley
Hawe, Recent Developments in Utah Law, Utah's Revised Limited Liability Act, 2001
Utah L. Rev. 1099, 1100-01). "The Revised Act was effective July 1, 2001. It repealed
and replaced the original Act." Id.
The Act contemplates actions between members to "interpret, apply, or enforce
the . . . duties, obligations, or liabilities between and among a company, its members and
managers, or the rights or powers of, or restrictions on, the company, the members or
managers." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-505. This Court has applied the provisions of the
Act to disputes between LLC members, even when the party is a "former" member. See,
e.g., Millsap, 2005 UT 42,fflj16-22 (holding Act's expulsion provisions applied to
member who had previously resigned); Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^ 14-22, 158 P.3d
540 (holding LLC Act allowed operating agreement to modify Act's member removal
provisions); Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 40-41, 190 P.3d 1269 (holding Act
protected member from personal liability).
The LLC Act uses a "contract by statute" model. (Armstrong, supra, Vol. 14, No.
5, at 13, cited in Millsap, 2005 UT 42, \ 11 n.l, and submitted as Add. Ex. D.)

cc

[T]he

statute sets up numerous 'default' rules that apply if the governing documents for the
LLC (the articles of organization and the operating agreement) do not provide
otherwise." (Id.)
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In the absence of a written operating agreement or other document to the contrary,
the Revised Act's provisions control and define the rights and responsibilities of Utah
LLC members; the procedures for determining and accounting for members' ownership
interests; and the creation, existence, dissolution, and winding up of the entity. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-401 to -1008, -1201 to -1214, -1301 to -1309. In cases in
which the provisions of the Revised Act are implicated, their terms provide the yardstick
for measuring LLC members' conduct. See Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^ 16 & 22.
In this case, neither the articles of organization nor an LLC operating agreement
provided rules governing members' interests in the company, the allocation of profits and
losses, capital accounts, dissolution, or winding up. (Exs. 68-69; R. 2019 at 280, 2020 at
400, 2022 at 771-72, 787-88); Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(16). In the absence of any
such written agreement, the provisions of the Act provide the operating agreement for the
LLC. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -901 to -906, -1001, -1003, -1308;
Armstrong, supra, Vol. 14, No. 7, at 24 (Add. Ex. D); Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d
259, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). In other words, the Act's provisions provide the rule
of decision because the Act is the contract.
B.

The court of appeals prejudicially erred in failing to require the
application of the Act to Burningham's case.

In the absence of a governing document on point, the provisions of the LLC Act
dictate that a member's interests in the company, and that member's allocation of profits
and losses, are calculated according to the member's statutorily defined capital account.

See id. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -901 to -906, -1001, -1003, -1308. The Revised Aci defines a
capital account:
"Capital account," unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement,
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the company for
each member to reflect the value of all contributions by that member, the amount
of all distributions to that member or the member's assignee, the member's share
of profits, gains, and losses of the company, and the member's share of the net
assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to the
member or the member's assignee.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3).
The capital account adjusts when capital contributions are made "by or on behalf
of an existing member" and in other instances defined by statute. Id. § 48-2c-903(l)(b),
(c). "If the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, profits and losses are
allocated in proportion to the members' capital account balances." Id. § 48-2c-906.
Upon dissolution, capital accounts are used to calculate a member's entitlement to
company profits or allocation of company losses after first satisfying creditors. Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1003, -1308.
The court of appeals recognized this law, but then failed to apply it properly in the
context of this dispute. The lower court held that "the provisions of the LLC Act serve as
default positions that govern an LLC if its members do not include contrary language in
their operating agreement or in the LLC's articles of organization." (Ct. App. Op. ^j 18.)
"The parties here did not incorporate any such changes in OLP's governing documents,
and thus, the LLC Act provides the appropriate procedures for determining, among other
things, Wilson and Burningham's respective ownership interests in OLP." (Id.) The
court agreed with Burningham's assessment of the Act:
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The LLC Act provides that an LLC shall maintain a capital account for
each member, representing that member's share of the net assets of the company.
See [Utah Code Ann.] § 48-2c-903(l). A member's capital account reflects the
member's initial contribution and is then adjusted upwards or downwards based
on the member's additional contributions and on certain distributions to the
member. See id. A member's voting rights, rights to share in profits, and
ownership interest in the LLC are all measured in proportion to the member's
capital account. See id; see also id. §§ 48-2c-803 (determining required voting
majorities for member-managed LLCs in terms of profit interests), -906
(allocating profit interests between members in proportion to their capital
accounts).
(Ct.App.Qp.119.)
Notwithstanding this correct recitation of the law, the court of appeals incorrectly
held that the jury had decided the LLC capital accounts issue against Burningham. The
court reasoned: "Because the question of capital contributions to OLP was a factual one,
it was appropriate for the jury to determine the parties' ownership interests in OLP." (Ct.
App. Op. T| 21.) The court of appeals' analysis of this issue is premised on prejudicial
error.
The jury did not and could not "determine the parties' ownership interests in OLP"
without proper legal instructions on capital accounts using the LLC Act as the rule of
decision. The LLC Act's "default provisions" on capital accounts were "adopted by the
parties when they failed to contractually vary them." (Ct. App. Op. ^ 20.) Thus, the
provisions of the Act provide the rule of decision. However, Wilson and the district court
both expressly agreed that the court, not the jury, would decide the capital accounts issue.
(R. 2026 at 1319-30.) The district court did not instruct the jury on how to consider or
apply capital contributions in determining ownership interests. (R. 1109-72, 2026 at
1319-30.)

The very sections of the LLC Act that the court of appeals cites provide the rule of
decision to any fact finder designated to decide this issue. By agreement of the parties
and the district court, however, these provisions deliberately were not given to the jury as
tools for measuring such conduct. (R. 2026 at 1330.) Consequently, as a matter of law,
the jury could not do what the court of appeals assumed it "apparently" did - decide the
ownership interest issue adversely to Burningham. (Ct. App. Op. U 20.) At least, the jury
could not legitimately have done so on this record.
Very specific conversations with the district judge took place on the record
regarding this issue. (R. 2026 at 1319-32, 2028 at 1507-11.) The district court ruled that
questions asked of the jury would only be a jumping-off point for determining capital
accounts. In examining the proposed special verdict forms, the court observed that the
jury verdict questions were "advisory unless you agree that they're binding." (R. 2028 at
1508.)
THE COURT: . . . 1 think it's only an advisory answer and I still have to use my
judgment and my findings.
THE COURT: It doesn't matter how they answer it, I make my own findings of
fact based on the evidence on that issue for purposes of equitable issues. Now you
could agree on the record that you want the jury to answer all of those questions
and then they become the binding answers. Then I put in more questions that
relieve me of the findings. If they answer it over the objection of one of you as I
understand the law . . . if they answer the question and you don't agree, it can only
be advisory no matter what we do. . ..
(R. 2028 at 1510.) With that direct assurance from the court, Burningham agreed to a
non-specific jury verdict form, reserved his interest-by-capital-accounts theory for the
subsequent court proceedings, and withdrew his counterclaim regarding the amount and
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effect of Wilson's capital contributions for subsequent determination by the court. (R.
2026 at 1327-30, 2028 at 1508-10, 2029 at 3-4.)
On this record, it was prejudicial error for the court of appeals to suggest that the
jury had decided the capital accounts question. Burningham's case was never heard. His
whole theory of the case from the very outset was based on a determination of capital
accounts. (R. 38-66.) The verdict form put to the jury asked only about whether the
parties had initially agreed to a 50/50 arrangement, a fact not in dispute. (R. 1204-08.)
Indeed, the district court observed that the initial 50/50 arrangement was all but irrelevant
under the procedure the court had outlined:
THE COURT: The first question is you agree they had an agreement to form an
owner's 50/50 partners [sic]. I wasn't even sure we needed the 50/50, but
essentially that's conceded. I'm not sure it matters either way.
THE COURT: And at least at the outset I think that would be my finding. It's a
whole different story of what you might argue thereafter.
(R. 2028 at 1511.)
The only reason Bumingham would agree to a jury considering this was in light of
the court's ruling that this was informational only for the court's purposes. As
Burningham's counsel observed, "Plaintiffs are claiming today that it [the members'
profits interest] stayed 50/50 and that they're entitled to 50 percent of the profits. We're
claiming that that changed because the law made it change. . .. We think it's up to the
Court to decide whether the law made it change." (R. 2026 at 1327.) The district court
observed, "then you don't need to instruct the jury on how to discern that." (R. 2026 at
1327.)
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capital accounts. Without a resolution of the capital accounts issue, judgment could not
properly enter on whether an LLC member had the requisite authority to do what he did,
acted in compliance with the parties' statutorily defined contract or fiduciary duties, or
suffered damages.
Capital contributions are but one element of an LLC capital account. See Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3). Also includable are the allocations of profits, gains, and
losses of the company and the amount of distributions to a member. See id. Where no
such analysis was ever undertaken, the court of appeals incorrectly premised its
conclusion on its review of the capital contribution dispute. (Ct. App. Op. ^fij 2-21.)
This Court need not decide whether capital accounts determinations are always for
the district court or whether a jury may make the decision. In this case, all parties agreed
the capital accounts determination should be made by the district judge. (R. 2026 at
1330.) Reversible error resulted when this subsequently was not done, with the court of
appeals then recharacterizing the issue as having been put to and decided by the jury.
The effect of the appellate ruling was to allow a judgment in this LLC dispute without
proper consideration and application of the LLC Act.
For these reasons, which appear of record, the case should be reversed and
remanded for a proper application of the LLC Act. The judgment against Burningham is
based on an erroneous legal foundation that is prejudicial as a matter of law. Burningham
is entitled to a judgment that considers and incorporates the relevant governing provisions
oftheLLCAct.
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This Court should not allow the court of appeals to alter the LLC landscape in this
confused manner. These competing and inconsistent descriptions of a newly minted
common law "LLC repudiation claim" lose sight of the context of this dispute.
Wilson's complaint pleaded a cause of action for common law anticipatory
repudiation under the parties5 LLC agreement. (R. 18.) Anticipatory repudiation, taught
in first-year contracts courses, describes a common law claim for breach of contract
based on actions taken or statements made before performance under a contract is due.
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1306 (7th ed. 1999). Wilson claimed in his initial
pleading, and throughout the case, that the parties had orally agreed to a 50/50 ownership
in the LLC covering new accounts, and that Burningham had violated the parties'
contract - anticipatorily and otherwise - by failing to honor that agreement. (R. 6, 18-22,
2016 at 14-15.)
Before trial, Burningham filed motions seeking legal determinations that the LLC
Act must be applied to determine the parties' ownership interests. (R. 608-27, 523-32,
669-70, 882-87, 899-901, 934-36.) Burningham showed that the undisputed fact record
called for dissolution of the LLC as of August 31, 2001, with a winding up of the LLC
and distributions to its members as specified by the LLC Act to take place pursuant to the
statute. (R. 608-27.) "Throughout the course of the litigation, Burningham attempted to
have the dispute resolved through application of the LLC Act and sought a judicial
dissolution, accounting, and winding up of OLP's business pursuant to the LLC Act."
(Ct. App. Op. 1 9)
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B.

The LLC Act provides the rule of decision on dissolution.
1.

Judicial dissolution, not wrongful dissolution, is the correct
analysis.

In determining issues governed by statute, this Court looks to and applies the plain
language of those statutes. See Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806,
809 (Utah 1988). Legislative enactments "establish the laws of this state respecting the
subjects to which they relate." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. When LLC disputes arise, the
provisions of the LLC Act control. See, e.g., Millsap, 2005 UT 42, U 16, 116 P.3d 366.
The LLC Act enumerates specified events of dissolution, including judicial
dissolution. Id. § 48-2c-1201(7). If the court determines grounds exist for judicial
dissolution, it may enter a decree dissolving the company and specifying the effective
date of the dissolution. Id. § 48-2c-1213(l).
The provisions invoked by Burningham provide for dissolution by any member if
there is "deadlock" or if "it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business of the
company in conformity with its articles of organization and operating agreement." Id.
§ 48-2c-1210(2)(a), (c), (e); R. 616. The other grounds under the statute (illegal,
oppressive, or fraudulent acts, and misapplication or waste of company assets) were not
invoked by either member as grounds for dissolution here. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c1210(2)(b), (d); R. 616, 703, 717-20. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Wilson on his ownership claim, the district court granted Bumingham's motion judicially
dissolving the LLC. (R. 2026 at 1282.)
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dissolution statute were met as a matter of law as of August 31, 2001. (R. 2026 at 1282.)
The implications of such a dissolution are discussed next.
2.

Judicial dissolution is a legally "rightful" dissolution that carries
with it statutory implications not followed here.

The court of appeals was unconcerned with whether the LLC was actually
dissolved because it saw no connection between its articulated "repudiation" claim and
the LLC's dissolution. (Ct. App. Op.ffl|23-24.) Here, especially, the court of appeals'
reference to "repudiation" to blend both a wrongful dissolution concept and a contract
claim for damages needs careful consideration.
First, taking the "repudiation" term to mean "anticipatory contract repudiation,"
the court of appeals overlooked that the LLC contract was defined by statute and that the
statute therefore provides the rule of decision in determining a breach. See supra Part I.
This means that such claims must be adjudicated using the provisions of the Act,
including those governing dissolution of an LLC and its consequences. The court of
appeals recognizes or at least suggests this was not done. (Ct. App. Op.ffl|23, 48.)
More importantly, taking the "repudiation" term to mean the "wrongful
dissolution" found by the jury, judicial dissolution of an LLC is legally inconsistent with
such a finding. Because the LLC was dissolved in accordance with the plain terms of the
Act, under authority of the supervising court, it is a fortiori a "rightful" dissolution by
operation of law.
In Wanlass v. DLand Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1990), a case decided under
statutory partnership law, the court applied plain statutory language in rejecting a claim

of wrongful dissolution. Id. at 572. The court held that, because the partnership had
dissolved according to the terms of the statute, a claim for wrongful dissolution would
not lie. See id. (citing relevant statutory provisions). Consequently, no basis existed for
the plaintiff to claim extra-statutory relief based on a "wrongful dissolution" concept.
See id. at 571, 572. This analysis is correct.
In an appellate case from another jurisdiction, the Florida Court of Appeals
likewise held to the operative language of the statute and eschewed a contrary wrongful
dissolution argument. In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care,
Inc., 732 So.2d 1156 (Fla. App. 1999), Southern Oaks claimed Horizon wrongfully
dissolved their partnership, allegedly entitling Southern Oaks to future projected
earnings. Id. at 1157-58. The court disagreed, holding that the determination of when a
partnership dissolved and the parameters of liability of the partners upon dissolution were
determined by statute, and that the statute did not provide for damages based on future
partnership earnings. Id. at 1159-61. The court rejected Southern Oaks' claim that the
cause of action was merely contractual:
We find Southern Oaks' argument without merit. . . . [T]he trial court's finding
that the parties are incapable of continuing to operate in business together is a
finding of "irreconcilable differences," a permissible reason for dissolving the
partnerships under the express terms of the partnership agreements. Thus,
dissolution was not "wrongful," assuming there can be "wrongful" dissolutions,
and Southern Oaks was not entitled to damages for lost future profits.
Id. at 1159; see id. at 1159-60 (noting governing statute "does not refer to the dissolutions
as rightful or wrongful" but rather "outlines the events causing dissolution without any
provision for liability for damages"). The court concluded:
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There no longer appears to be "wrongful" dissolution - either dissolution is
provided for by contract or statute or the dissolution was improper and the
dissolution order should be reversed. In the instant case, because the dissolution
either came within the terms of the partnership agreements or [Florida Statutes]
paragraph 620.880l(5)(c) (judicial dissolution where it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the partnership business), Southern Oaks' claim for lost
future profits is without merit.
Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, and importantly for this appeal, courts considering limited liability
company disputes have carefully hewed to the language of the LLC statute in
determining whether an LLC is properly dissolved by judicial authority and what the
ramifications of such a dissolution will be. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d
825 (S.D. 2008) (reversing and remanding with an order for statutory dissolution and
winding up) (collecting cases); Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004) (ordering judicial dissolution when one member withdrew); Weinmann v. Duhon,
818 So.2d 206 (La. App. 2002) (vacating and remanding district court contract judgment
and holding that statutory dissolution was the proper remedy).
The Utah Legislature passes legislation advisedly. See State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT
App 27, H 21, 64 P.3d 1218. In contrast to the LLC Act, Utah's Partnership Act has
wrongful dissolution provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28(2), -34, -35(2); Wanlass,
790 P.2d at 572. The drafters of the LLC Act considered but did not adopt the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, which would have provided for "wrongful dissociation"
in a manner similar to the Partnership Act. See Uniform LLC Act Ann. § 602 (1996);
Armstrong, Vol. 14, No. 5, at 12.

Dissolution by proper judicial authority on the grounds invoked by Burningham
under the Act is, by definition, lawful and "rightful" dissolution, implementing at that
point statutory procedures for winding up the company. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c1213(2). These procedures contemplate an accounting of the LLC. See infra Part 111. It
was error to ignore these statutory mandates and allow post-dissolution damages as if the
statute had no effect. See Southern Oaks, 732 So.2d at 1161.
Because of this legal error, the court below improperly affirmed denial of
Burningham's legal motions asking the court to follow and give effect to statutory
dissolution and winding up procedures. (R. 625, 891, 1023, 1203-07, 2024 at 979-81 &
989-90, 2026 at 1278, 2028 at 1550 & 1649-50, 1686-88, 1700-03, 1876, 1980.) This
Court should reverse on the law and remand for proceedings that properly follow and
apply the LLC Act.
C.

Gherman was wrongly adapted and applied.

The notion of "wrongful dissolution" is rooted in the seminal partnership case of
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 1977). Gherman was a statutory tort
case brought under California law. See id. at 341, 336, 340 & n.10. Its reasoning,
however, suggested that the statute incorporated common law partnership principles.
Gherman was followed without analysis in Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev.
1985) (per curiam), then cited in dicta in Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572
(Utah App. 1990).
The parties in Gherman entered into a joint venture to purchase land. 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 336. Once the purchase was completed, Colburn denied the existence of any
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joint venture with Gherman whatsoever: 'There exists no 'Colburn-Gherman joint
venture'. .. ." Id. at 337, 344. The court distinguished such an outright tortious denial of
the relationship's existence from the more common case of a partnership contract breach.
Id. at 342-43. Holding that the former was more akin to the breach of a non-contract
duty, and relying on the codification of that principle in the California statutes, the court
permitted the plaintiff partner to recover damages beyond the date of dissolution. Id. at
340-41,344-45.
The court allowed such recovery when "there has been a repudiation of the basic
concept - a denial of the very existence of a partnership or joint venture relationship in
any form or at any time." Id. at 343. This kind of repudiation is not "the failure, without
legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract." Id.
Thus, even if the entire contract is breached, this is not the "repudiation" tort described in
Gherman. See id. Gherman distinguished its special tortious "repudiation" from the
circumstances in which a defendant "recognizes the existence of a partnership but
breaches some obligation in the performance of the partnership agreement not amounting
to wrongful dissolution in contravention of the agreement." Id. at 339.
The court of appeals panel acknowledged that, on this record, "if we were to
import Gherman directly into Utah LLC law, Burningham would appear to be correct that
the parties' mutual acknowledgment of OLP's existence would preclude a repudiation
claim." (Ct. App. Op. ^| 38.) Nevertheless, the court modified the Gherman claim so that
such a prerequisite does not exist in Utah law - eliminating the very distinction that gave
rise to the concept in the first place. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 39.) The court then affirmed the

application of this new "repudiation5' claim in the LLC context by a showing of
anticipatory contract breach. (Id.)
As a matter of law, common law partnership repudiation of the kind described in
Gherman did not happen here. There was a significant difference of opinion about the
factual scope of what was included in the LLC and the members5 respective ownership
interests. (R. 201 8 at 205-43, 2019 at 244-383, 2020 at 384-490, 2021 at 491-710, 2022
at 714-813, 2023 at 820-86 & 892-957, 2024 at 995-1112, 2025 at 1134-1245, 2027 at
1413-1502, 2028 at 1532-44; Exs. Vols. I-IV.) There was no difference of opinion,
however, regarding the existence of the LLC or the fact that the LLC had customers,
assets, and liabilities. (R. 1, 5-7, 42-44, 55, 272-301, 1377-78, 1383, 2019 at 271, 274,
286, 2020 at 406, 423, 2021 at 491, 494-95, 499-500, 2024 at 1096-97, 2027 at 13971400, 2028 at 1511; Exs. 68, 69.) As a matter of law, breach of contract under these
circumstances does not qualify as Gherman repudiation.
The legal instruction to the jury on this point was wrong on the law. (R. 1146.)
Furthermore, the legal motions demonstrating the failure of this necessary element of the
Gherman claim should have been granted. (R. 1203-07, 1686-89.) But for these errors, a
judgment could not have entered on a wrongful dissolution verdict.
The court of appeals justified its departure from Gherman on grounds that Jeaness
did not require a finding of repudiation like that in Gherman. (Ct. App. Op. ^| 39.)
Jeaness was &per curiam decision that applied Gherman without analysis: neither party
argued the point. See Jeaness, passim. The decision nevertheless rested squarely and
fully on Gherman. See id., 706 P.2d at 145-46. Wanlass cited both decisions, but only in
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dicta, as it rejected the need for a wrongful dissolution analysis in light of an authorized
statutory dissolution. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. The watering down of a legal
principle through inattention is not the same as the reasoned development of the common
law.
As a matter of policy, if the common law is to be applied it should be applied to
give effect to the wisdom it embodies. The concept of repudiation of the entity is
premised on a willful act considered transcendent of mere breach and therefore tortious.
See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41, 344-45. That concept has been captured in
California law by statute. See id. In Utah, there is no such statute. Nor does Utah
recognize tortious breach of contract as California does. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch,
701 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah 1985) (rejecting tortious breach of contract approach of
Seamans' Direct Buying Serv.} Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984)).
Thus, if Gherman is to be adopted as a special extra-statutory rule in Utah LLC cases the first of its kind in the nation - it should be distinguished from ordinary contract cases
on the grounds that distinguished it in the first place.
On review, the court of appeals' decision should be reversed. That decision
incorrectly affirms erroneous district court legal determinations describing and applying
the Gherman repudiation element in this case. On both statutory and common law
grounds, that decision is wrong as a matter of law. Without such determinations, the jury
verdict cannot stand as entered and the judgment based thereon should be vacated.

III.

The court of appeals erred in procedurally precluding consideration of
Burningham's claims and defenses.
For the independent reasons set forth in this Part 111, individually and collectively,

the Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for properly
supervised proceedings.
A.

The lower courts erred in declining to judicially supervise the winding
up and termination of the LLC following its dissolution.

Dissolution does not terminate an LLC. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1203.
Rather, it marks the end-point for the ordinary, day-to-day carrying on of business as
usual; and it marks the starting point for "winding up" and liquidating the company.
See id. § 48-2c-1213(2). The LLC Act defines winding up:
The winding up of a dissolved company is the process consisting of collecting all
amounts owed to the company, selling or otherwise disposing of the company's
assets and property, paying or discharging the taxes, debts and liabilities of the
company or making provision for the payment or discharge, and distributing all
remaining company assets and property among the members of the company
according to their interests. There is no fixed time period for completion of
winding up a dissolved company except that the winding up should be completed
within a reasonable time under the circumstances.
Id. § 48-2c-1301. Winding up of necessity requires accounting for all assets and
liabilities, identifying profits and losses, and determining the status of capital accounts for
each member. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -903(l)(a), -906, -1003, -1301, 1308(2). In their pleadings, both members asked for just such an accounting. (R. 15-17,
58-60, 63, 224, 293-95, 427, 501.)
The court of appeals erred as a matter of law by declining to require a winding up
and liquidation of the LLC in accordance with the LLC Act. "After entering the decree
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of dissolution, the court shall direct the winding up and liquidation of the company's
business and affairs in accordance with Part 13." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1213(2). The
court of appeals dealt with this law by suggesting the LLC was not dissolved; by
concluding the obligation was permissive rather than mandatory; and by holding that
LLC members, not the court, wind up the company. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 23, 28-3 ].)
The court of appeals' handling of this LLC issue resulted in harmful error to
Burningham and 1ARC. Specifically, had the court properly overseen an LLC accounting
in a winding up, Wilson would have been entitled, at best, to a credit to his capital
account, not a check representing an LLC distribution free of any other obligations.
Under the LLC Act, a member's capital account reflects, among other things, "the
member's share of profits, gains, and losses of the company" and "the member's share of
the net assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to
the member or the member's assignee." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3). Applying
correct legal principles, a determination regarding the scope of the LLC and the amount
of profits attributable to Wilson does not of itself result in a check being cut to Wilson for
that amount, as the district court judgment purports to do.
Distributions to LLC members occur only per the Act. "If the operating
agreement does not otherwise provide, each current distribution shall be made to all
members concurrently, or at other times determined by the members in a membermanaged company . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1002. Moreover, distributions are
made to members "in connection with the dissolution and winding up of a company . . .
in accordance with Section 48-2c-1308." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1003.

Here, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision not to oversee the
steps called for by the Act to effectuate a winding up. (Ct. App. Op. T) 22-31.) Until this
happens, Wilson is not entitled to a $1.2 million return on his $23,500 investment.
At the time of dissolution, as well as at the time of trial, the LLC still owed the
bank hundreds of thousands of dollars for the machine it owned. (Ex. 670.) Under the
Act, moreover, creditors get paid before liquidating distributions are made to members.
See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1308. If Burningham's capital contributions were in fact
''loans55 from 1ARC to OLP, then IARC is entitled to a return of its money with
appropriate interest before Wilson gets to take profits out of the company. See id; R.
2029 at 3-4. Moreover, a member owning a greater percentage of the company would
bear a greater percentage of any losses after expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c1308.
The lower courts, however, did not apply the law in this way. The result was that
Wilson was given a judgment representing "profits55 of $1.2 million, while Burntngham
was saddled with the LLC's bank debt and IARC did not receive any "loaned55 money
back. This is simply not a correct application of the law.
The district court specifically deferred winding up after dissolution, then held that
no winding up would take place - because, it said, the jury's non-statutory wrongful
dissolution conclusion had obviated the statutory remedy. (R. 1583-87.) This is exactly
backwards. See Southern Oaks, 732 So.2d at 1160-61 (holding statute obviates extrastatutory remedy). This Court should correct that error because the court of appeals
failed to do so.
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B.

Burningham was entitled to an actual accounting of the LLC.

The district court's pretrial rulings were that legal claims would be tried first, not
exclusively. (R. 1023.) Yet the court never would go beyond the jury verdict to reach
Burningham's other claims. The court of appeals failed to correct the error.
"An 'accounting' is defined as an adjustment of the accounts of the parties and a
rendering of a judgment for the balance ascertained to be due. An action for an
accounting usually invokes the equity powers of the court, and the remedy that is most
frequently resorted to . . . is by way of a suit in equity." Mankert v. Elmatco Prods., Inc.,
854 A.2d 766, 768 (Conn. App. 2004) (citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d 609, Accounts & Accounting
§ 52 (1994)); see also Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001) (same).
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accounting is performed by the court sitting
in equity, not a jury sitting as a legal tribunal. See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d
568, 573 (Utah App. 1990). Preliminary issues regarding the terms of the parties'
agreement may be determined first by a fact finder; but if they are, the trial consists of the
bare minimum necessary to perform the accounting. See, e.g., id.; Simpson v. Simpson,
311 F.2d 770, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1962). Damages are not awarded, and judgment does
not enter, on a jury verdict. Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. Once foundational issues are
resolved, the accounting proceeds under the direction of the court. See id.
To render an accounting, either the district court or a designated special master or
independent CPA undertakes a detailed examination of the business's accounts. Upon
completion, a report is generated allocating profits and losses, addressing outstanding
issues, and proposing a plan for liquidation. The parties then have the opportunity to

object to any discrete portion of the report. The matter is thereafter settled with a final
accounting as reflected in findings of fact entered by the trial court, which are reviewable
upon appeal. See Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, ^ 4-8, 14-17, 82
P.3d 203 (describing accounting process and court's review of final accounting).
Burningham was entitled to the specificity provided by this process, with actual
and discrete reviewable determinations on accounts, expenses, assets, liabilities, profits,
losses, capital accounts, and distributions. The district court denied Burningham this
right. The jury verdict itself, and the judgment entered thereon, are now purported to
represent the sum total of deliberations on these issues - issues that were not for the jury
- with no chance for the kind of meaningful review called for by judicial decisions. (R.
1583-86, 2029 at 14-16; Ct. App. Op.ffl[21, 34.)
The district court's approach to resolving the accounting issues failed to address
numerous questions inherent in this LLC dispute necessary for a fair resolution of this
dispute: What are the members' respective capital accounts? What went into them?
What are the LLC's allocated costs and expenses? What are they for? As to which
customers? What non-customer expenditures are included? What is the percentage
allocation to the LLC of lARC's overhead? For what items? How are post-dissolution
matters accounted for? How does the ultimate accounting differ from the LLC's CPA
determinations? How should prior LLC tax returns already filed with the taxing
authorities be amended, if at all? What about unfiled returns? Are Wilson's gaming
magazines, purchased with an LLC credit card, an allowed expense? (Ex. 362.) How
can Burningham challenge or defend individual expense items when he doesn't know
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what they are? What accounting determination would result in a 5000% return on a
member's investment?
These questions require an answer under the LLC Act. The winding up provisions
of the Act contemplate an actual accounting. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1301. These
questions can only be answered by a court following and applying an established,
reviewable accounting procedure that was not provided here. This Court should reverse.
The district court exceeded its discretion here by putting legal claims to the jury
without ever sorting through these issues. The accounting remedy, if not waived, is for
the court to consider. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ^ 33, 993 P.2d 191
(recognizing accounting general rule but concluding the defendant had waived it); Mills
v. Gray, 167 P. 358, 359-60 (Utah 1917) (citing general rule); Charlesworth v. Reyns,
2005 UT App 214, 113 P.3d 1031 (same). In this case, Bumingham never agreed to
submit the accounting issue to a jury or otherwise waived it. (R. 54, 58-60, 293-95, 88385, 1583-84.) Bumingham insisted at all times he be afforded his right to an accounting
by the court. (R. 303-05, 524-32, 1524-29, 1583-84, 2017 at 43-44.) Bumingham further
submitted that, once the proper ownership interests were fixed under the LLC statute, and
once the proper scope of the LLC was resolved, any monies properly allocated and found
to be due and owing in an actual court-supervised accounting would be received, paid, or
distributed as required thereby. (R. 327, 374, 2014 at 12.) No such proper determination
was ever made.
The court of appeals rejected the need for an accounting in light of the verdict and
the court's articulated repudiation claim. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 34.) The court concluded that

repudiation was an exception to the accounting-first requirement under Gherman. (Ct.
App. Op. TI 34.) Here, where Gherman's elements were not met, that decision is
reversible. See supra Part II.C. More importantly, Gherman is an exception to the
accounting-first rule, not an excuse never to render an accounting at all.
In sum, Burningham is entitled to the LLC accounting both he and Wilson asked
for when this case was filed. The court of appeals erred in sanctioning a procedure that
allowed the district court never to reach this issue.
C.

Burningham was deprived of the opportunity to have his purely
equitable claims and defenses heard.

Lastly, the court of appeals' decision affirming that the district court need not hold
promised proceedings deprived Burningham of the chance to have his "purely" equitable
claims and defenses adjudicated - "equitable" used in this sense to refer to his pleaded
estoppel and laches defenses. (R. 54.) The district court (1) set up a special procedure in
these proceedings for handling equitable claims and defenses, (2) ruled that evidence
would be presented separately to the court and that Burningham need not present all
evidence at the jury trial, (3) then specifically declined to follow this outlined course. (R.
1023, 1410-13, 1419-21, 1524-29, 1537, 1551-57, 1578-79, 1583-87, 2014 at 2-5 & 8 &
11, 2016 at 43-44, 2026 at 1372-73, 2028 at 1508-09, 2029 at 2.)
After the fact, the court invoked the general rule oiZions First Nat 7 Bank v.
Rocky Mtn. Irr., Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), to hold that equitable issues are
circumscribed by jury determinations where the same operative facts give rise to the
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claim. (R. 1585.) But the rule in Zions applies only if the same operative facts relate to
legal and equitable issues. See 795 P.2d at 661-63.
Here, Burningham's estoppel theory was based on the fact that Wilson had taken
inconsistent positions on dissolution. (Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 22.) The facts
underlying this issue were not tried to the jury. (R. 289, 1104-08, 2018-208.) Moreover,
Burningham's laches theory was that Wilson had delayed the proceedings to allow a
greater claim based on the continued operation of the LLC while its fate was
undetermined, an issue not encompassed within the jury proceedings. (Id.; Ct. App. Aplt.
Reply Br. at 22; see Sciutti v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 85 P. 1011, 1012 (Utah 1906)
(holding laches can include delay within an already filed proceeding).) These arguments
were never heard. Moreover, IARC was never heard on its claim for declaratory relief
related to funds that Wilson argued were IARC "loans."
These petitioners are entitled to have the claims and defenses they raised actually
adjudicated. Where issues are preempted and never decided, a litigant has not had his
day in court.
The procedure followed below does not reflect how justice or equity should be
meted out in the Utah courts. If a claim is to be tried in a particular forum or in a
particular way, a party is entitled to notice of that fact and the right to present evidence
and be heard on it. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 286
P.2d 249,253 (Utah 1955). Burningham and IARC were deprived of that opportunity
here and appeal to this Court for redress.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.
The case should then be remanded for proceedings consistent with a proper application of
Utah law, including the rights and remedies prescribed by the Utah LLC Act.
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